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THIRTEENTH ANNUAL GROTIUS LECTURE
RESPONSE
AMARTYA SEN’S VISION FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS – AND WHY HE NEEDS THE LAW
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE*
I would like to thank the American Society of International Law
and the American University Washington College of Law for
inviting me to be a commentator on the lecture of one of my heroes
in the intellectual world: Amartya Sen. This year, the Annual
Meeting of the American Society for International Law has a
particularly appropriate Grotius Lecturer. While Professor Sen and
Hugo Grotius part company on a number of specific issues, they
share quite a lot as well.
Both Professor Sen and Hugo Grotius have ranged widely across
intellectual fields. Professor Sen started as an economist and he now
occupies a prominent place in political philosophy, public policy,
and law. Hugo Grotius was trained first as a lawyer, but ranged
widely over philosophy and religion. Their perspectives— over the
tops and around the edges of disciplines, as it were—give their
writings extraordinary influence and reach. Each is a public
intellectual, to use a modern term, and each has combined a
commitment to public life with the careful tending of the life of the
mind.
Both men came of age in times of religious strife and this early
experience profoundly shaped their work. Hugo Grotius‘s early
career fell at a time when Calvinists and Reformers came to blows in
* Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs in the
Woodrow Wilson School and the University Center for Human Values, as well as
Director of the Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University, and
Faculty Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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his native Holland, as a result of which he spent some time in jail for
being on the wrong side of the conflict.1 Marked by reaction against
this intolerance, Grotius kept seeking some point of harmony in a
religiously divided world. Professor Sen came of age in India during
the bloody partition with Pakistan. He personally witnessed the way
that religious strife fueled economic deprivation which led to
violence and then to victimization. He, too, came face to face with
religious conflict and became determined to transcend it. As he
writes in his Nobel Prize autobiography, first-hand experience with
the victims of the Muslim-Hindu conflict ―made me aware of the
dangers of narrowly defined identities.‖2
Having seen first-hand how religious intolerance could be
destructive, both Professor Sen and Hugo Grotius devoted substantial
attention to the question of normativity and its philosophical
grounding, hoping to find a way out of narrow sectarian justification
into a realm of reason. They therefore both want to locate
normativity in the connection between reasoned argument and its
relationship to evidence. Grotius thought that normativity rested in
the properties of actions—properties that could be discerned through
―right reason.‖3 Professor Sen argues that normativity rests in the
degree of freedom that a person possesses, enabling her to concretely
realize her capabilities.4 Which freedoms should be valued over
others, Professor Sen tells us, depends on reasoned public debate that
should be conducted through adopting the perspective of impartial
objectivity5—different in practice but similar in function to Grotius‘s
1. See Jon Miller, Hugo Grotius, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (July 28, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/
grotius/ (noting that Grotius was a reformer, also known as a ―Remonstrant,‖ who
was arrested after a ―Contra-Remonstrant‖ coup by orthodox Calvinists).
2. Amartya Sen, Autobiography, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.or
g/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1998/sen.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
3. See Miller, supra note 2 (―The law of nature is a dictate of right reason
―which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational
nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in
consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined.‖).
4. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 231 (2009) [hereinafter SEN,
IDEA OF JUSTICE] (―[I]ndividual advantage is judged in the capability approach by
a person‘s capability to do things he or she has reason to value.‖
5. See id. at 42 (―The reasoning that is sought in analyzing the requirements of
justice will incorporate some basic demands of impartiality . . . .‖).
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―right reason.‖ Both Professor Sen and Hugo Grotius therefore give
pride of place to a well-constructed conception of reason in sorting
out what normative commitments a community should defend.
Normativity ultimately rests, in both cases, on the results of such
reasoning rather than on mere processes through which the results
are reached.6
Perhaps the most important similarity between the two, however,
is that Grotius believed that rights consist of the means or powers of
an individual to do something, as does Professor Sen.7 Rights for
Grotius were properties of individuals that the individual determined
whether and how to deploy.8 Grotius therefore identified rights with
what Professor Sen has called the capabilities of persons. Of course,
the early seventeenth century version of this idea is substantially
different from the early twenty-first century version. In particular,
Grotius, like Thomas Hobbes, believed that all individual rights
could be given up in exchange for protection from a ruler,9 a view
that Professor Sen would radically challenge. And Grotius, unlike
Professor Sen, did not believe in the universality of rights, holding
instead that some people were naturally inferior and so, for example,
could be justly kept as slaves.10 It is nonetheless striking how close
6. See id. at 66-69 (basing an important critique of the work of John Rawls
precisely on the point that Rawls is too concerned with procedure and institutions,
and therefore fails to notice whether the results in the world are in fact better for
the people involved.); see also Miller, supra note 2 (reflecting the different
preoccupations of his time, Grotius believed that one could derive the basic rules
of normativity from the observation of nature itself).
7. See Miller, supra note 2 (―When we say that no-and-so has the right to
such-and-such, we usually mean that he has the means or power to do such and
such . . . . This was Grotius‘ view; though subsequently mediated by others, his
contribution was essential.‖); Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human
Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 328 (2004)(―By starting from the importance of
freedoms as the appropriate human condition on which to concentrate, rather than
on utilities (as Bentham did), we get a motivating reason not only for celebrating
our own rights and liberties, but also for taking an interest in the significant
freedoms of others. . . .‖.
8. See Miller, supra note 2 (―[W]hereas medieval theorists tended to speak of
‗the right,‘ Grotius and his successors stressed the powers and entitlements of the
person who has rights.‖).
9. See id. (explaining Grotius‘s viewed that rights of individuals could be
overridden by a ruler ―[b]ecause sovereignty is ‗that power . . .‘ whose actions are
not subject to the legal control of another‖).
10. See id. (detailing how Grotius maintained that individuals could sell their
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Grotius comes to Professor Sen‘s views about rights as capabilities.
Finally, both Grotius and Professor Sen have a global vision. The
American Society for International Law honors Grotius as the ―father
of international law‖ for his systematic work on the law of war, the
theory of states, and the development of the view that the
international arena can be characterized by the normative
relationships among states. Today, our Grotius lecturer, Amartya
Sen, is honored for his substantial contributions to a just world
marked by the respect for, and the empowering of, individuals.
With that background, let us examine the ideas that Amartya Sen
has brought to us today. He has given us a very rich conception of
what it means to have human rights—a conception that is notable for
focusing on those who are human rights‘ key intended beneficiaries,
and on the status of their lives, rather than on the institutions, rules,
and doctrines that are supposed to bring rights into being or provide
for their maintenance. The focus on the holders of rights makes
Professor Sen‘s contribution particularly moving, as the plight of the
individual—one who has few opportunities and no means to carry
out the scarce opportunities that she may have—should be at the
center of our concern. But, as Professor Sen notes, legal and
political theory often change the subject from the quality of lives of
real persons to the characteristics of the rules, principles, and
institutions that tee up political and legal decisions to be made about
those lives.11 Against this more formal view, Professor Sen argues
that restriction of the space of freedom, through closing the windows
and slamming the doors of opportunity, is a world-wide tragedy to
which we all must attend. Human rights create new opportunities
and provide the means through which people can have better lives.
As Professor Sen reminds us, it is the potential for better lives that
we must keep in view.
As he directs our attention towards those individuals whose rights
are most fragile and imperfectly guaranteed, however, Professor Sen
liberty, just as they could their labor, and thus, slavery could exist in a just
society).
11. See SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 66-74 (critiquing the work of
John Rawls for placing attention on institutional structures and the logic of just
rules over direct concern with the lives of disadvantaged people).
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has a number of skeptical things to say about the role of law in the
realization of rights. Since this is a room full of lawyers – and
international lawyers at that – I will argue that the legal recognition
and the law-based enforcement of human rights might be of more
assistance to the urgent mission that Professor Sen has undertaken
than he recognizes. Law cannot do everything, it is true, but law is
more crucial to more aspects of the project of opening the world of
opportunity to those who are downtrodden than Professor Sen has
given law credit for.
In my comments, then, I will address the general skepticism that
Professor Sen has shown for using law as a crucial tool in the
struggle for human rights. Further, I will provide a defense of law as
an important partner for his enterprise.

I.
According to Professor Sen, law is not the source of human rights
and therefore human rights should not be defined narrowly in legal
terms.12 Moral obligations to promote and protect human rights must
therefore go beyond the law. As a result, law cannot be a guide to
moral obligations.
At one level, I agree with Professor Sen. Law is not the source of
moral norms, and human rights are no different in this respect than
any other subject of law. In fact, in every field of law, the
normativity that sustains law comes from outside of law, which
never reaches all the way out to embrace the full spectrum of
normative concern. Domestic tort law does not exhaust our
normative obligations to each other. Family law does not exhaust the
normative obligations that exist among family members. Law is
always partial with respect to the normative field that it inhabits.
Law may trumpet the most important and shared elements of that
common moral field, but law does not exhaust the moral sources that
bring it into being.
12. See Amartya Sen, Grotius Lecture before the American University: The
Global Status of Human Rights (Mar. 23, 2011), in 27 AM. U. INT‘L. L. REV. 1, 4
(2011) [hereinafter Grotius Lecture] (―We need to see global human rights, I would
argue, over a much bigger arena, of which legal motivation, actual legislation and
judicial enforcement form only one part.‖). In arguing this, he rejected the association
that Bentham made between real law and real rights). Id. at 5-6.
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Criminal law is perhaps the best example. Criminal law only
picks out some of the offenses that violate the basic principles of a
community. Like Professor Sen‘s example of the wife who has a
right to be consulted in family decisions and who cannot (and who
should not be able to) call upon law to enforce this right, 13 the world
outside criminal law is full of important principles that, when
violated to the outrage of many, nonetheless should not be brought
under criminal prohibition. For example, cheating on a university
examination might get someone thrown out of a university, but it
generally does not come with criminal sanctions. [KLS: As a
colleague pointed out, this sounds like I approve the criminalization
of these things, so I would like to omit these examples.] Criminal
law only covers part of a general moral field.
The fact that any particular area of law fails to cover some actions
that may justly deserve moral condemnation is not an argument
against having law cover those morally wrong actions that are within
its purview. Law does not have to cover the whole scope of moral
outrage to nonetheless be normatively justified over the range that it
does have. Law, therefore, can be an important device for ensuring
the realization of moral norms even if it cannot, and should not,
cover all moral norms. In fact, law may well be wise to be
selective—which makes it no less important.
Unfortunately, Professor Sen concludes from his correct
observation that normatively justifiable rights often exceed legal
protection, which means that one might usefully fight for human
rights by leaving law largely aside.14 But because the law does not
underwrite moral obligations, it does not follow that law cannot
therefore be a central pillar of support in realizing the moral
obligations we do have. While Professor Sen acknowledges that law
13. See id. at 9 ( discussing that women have a moral right, even in traditional
male dominated societies, to take part in family decisions but noting that ―coercive‖ or
punitive legislation may be ―too blunt‖ an instrument to ensure that husbands consult
their wives in family decisions).
14. See id. at 9 (―Would it be reasonable to claim that if a human right is seen as
important, then it must be ideal to legislate it into a precisely specified legal right? I
will resist this proposal. For some rights, the ideal route may well not be legislation,
but something else, such as recognition or agitation, or even public discussion and
education, with the hope to changeing the behavior of those who contribute to the
violation of human rights.‖).
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may be helpful in some circumstances, one cannot help but be struck
by the way he moves away from law as quickly as possible to show
that human rights may develop perfectly well outside a legal
framework.15 But he may be thinking too narrowly about what law
might do to encourage this development.
To see why, let‘s take his example of the importance of
consultation within a marriage, where it is important for husbands to
recognize the moral right of a wife to be consulted in making key
decisions about family matters. Professor Sen argues that this
obligation does not spring from a legal duty, and enforcing this
obligation at law would be useless and even counterproductive.16
One can easily imagine the nightmarish State that would eavesdrop
on marriages and intervene in domestic arguments at the point where
mutual respect lags. Law has its limits.
Even with its limitations, law is not irrelevant to this discussion.
Perhaps the woman‘s moral right to be consulted by her husband is
more likely to be realized in practice where there is a broader web of
legal obligations that gives her legally protectable rights outside the
context where her moral right exists. If a woman is given moral
weight and social standing through having legal rights—to human
dignity, bodily autonomy, property, and more—then her moral right
to be consulted within a marriage may be more likely to be
recognized. And that will be true even though it would be hard for
the law to recognize her right to be consulted directly. Perhaps
having equal employment opportunities or the right to vote—
enforceable by law—would give her a sense that she is not defined
completely by her marriage, and having these other legal
entitlements would leverage her claim that she should be taken as an
equal in the home. Laws about the marriage relationship itself may
help to strengthen her moral right to consultation as well. Laws
against domestic violence may give her physical protection when she
asserts her moral rights within marriage. Laws that do not
automatically give custody of the children to the husband in a
15. See id. at 8 (―It is easy to appreciate that if human rights are seen as
powerful moral claims - indeed as ‗moral rights‘ (to use Hart's phrase) - then surely
we have reason for some catholicity in considering different avenues for promoting
these claims. Thus the ways and means of advancing the ethics of human rights
need not be confined only to making new laws.‖).
16. Id. at 9.
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divorce may give her more power within the marriage to bargain for
recognition of her claims. Laws that give her the right to leave her
marriage may be crucial as well.
The obligation that underwrites a woman‘s moral right to be
consulted stems from a basic principle of the basic moral equal worth
of persons. And even though the principle may not originate with
law, there are many ways that law can sustain a commitment to this
principle. Would a woman be likely to be consulted by her husband
absent a broader legal recognition of her value and equality? There
are some respectful husbands who would consult in any event,
regardless of whether the woman had a legally recognized right or
not. But recalcitrant husbands may need pressure from multiple
sides before they recognize women‘s moral rights to consultation.
Even if there are no laws requiring consultation, laws ensuring a
woman‘s equality outside marriage can empower a woman to ask
that her moral rights within the marriage be respected. In fact, as
Jeremy Waldron has noted, legal protections of basic rights may
create the preconditions for people to take risks by entering
marriages in the first place.17 If all parties have legal rights
independent of marriage as well as equal legal rights to leave
marriages, then relations within marriage may be more equal.
While I agree with Professor Sen that law is not the source of
human rights, nor does it exhaust the limits of human rights, law can
often contribute a great deal toward providing a context within which
these non-legal rights may be respected in practice. Law, therefore,
may be important in more ways than Professor Sen realizes. Law
might provide moral support, so to speak, for moral obligations that
go beyond the law.

II.
Professor Sen tells us that law deals in what Kant would call
―perfect obligations‖18 while human rights involve a great many
17. See Jeremy Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for
Rights, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 625, 628-29 (1988) (positing that legal rights
provide security and a basis for negotiation for married individuals when mutual
affection wavers).
18. See Immanuel Kant, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS 39 (Thomas K. Abbott trans., 1949) (1785), available at http://evans-
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―imperfect obligations‖ that are harder for the law to regulate.19 As a
result, law goes only part of the way toward ensuring the realization
of human rights.
The difference between perfect and imperfect obligations can be
seen in Professor Sen‘s example of torture. When a person has a
right not to be tortured, this imposes a ―perfect obligation‖ on
another person not to engage in the prohibited conduct toward her –
at all and ever. But the right not to be tortured also triggers
―imperfect obligations‖ for others to do what they can to stop torture
from occurring wherever and whenever it may arise. ―Doing what
one can‖ will depend on who particular people are and what their
capabilities may be. Someone at the top of a ministry may be able to
do more to prevent torture than can the fellow prisoner of the
potential torture victim because the minister can give more effective
orders and punish those who fail to follow them. Perhaps not all
ministers can do this; those who serve in governments under which
they would be executed for interfering with torture policy do not
have this leeway. One needs a great deal of detailed information to
work out what someone can be expected to do to realize imperfect
obligations.
Specifying all of the features that might cause imperfect
obligations to apply in a concrete situation will be a complex and
detailed – and perhaps even hopeless – task. That is why Professor
Sen believes that the law will never be able to regulate imperfect
obligations very well. Because these obligations cannot be specified
precisely enough in advance, the law may be too blunt an instrument
for conveying the subtlety of complex moral situations.20 Therefore,
Professor Sen argues, law will always shortchange the power of
human rights.
experientialism.freewebspace.com/kant_groundwork_metaphysics_morals01.htm
(explaining that ―perfect duties‖ are those obligations from which there can be no
exceptions).
19. See Grotius Lecture, supra note 13, at 10-11.
20. See id. at 10 (―It is important to emphasize that the recognition of human
rights is not an insistence that everyone everywhere must rise to help prevent every
violation of every human right no matter where it occurs. It is, rather, an
acknowledgement that if one is in a plausible position to do something effective in
preventing the violation of such a right, then one does have an obligation to
consider doing just that.‖). Sen implies that the law cannot be so subtle as to
anticipate every situation that might bear on the imperative to act.
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But here, too, law may be better than Professor Sen thinks at
working out what imperfect obligations may require and pushing
legal actors to attempt to realize as full a conception of human rights
as they reasonably can. That is because law takes a great many more
forms than a simple command to an individual to do or refrain from
doing something. For example, while it may be tricky to define
imperfect obligations of individuals because such positive
obligations can quickly interfere with protected freedoms, it is less
difficult to define imperfect obligations of states which themselves
have no moral freedom to assert in response.21 In fact, state officials
are quite legitimately restricted to act or refrain from acting in all
sorts of ways that would be illegitimate if those same restrictions
were put on ordinary individuals. States may be barred from
discrimination in contexts where individuals are free to decide on
whatever basis they like. For example, a state violates human rights
when it enforces a ban on cross-racial or same-sex marriage, while
an individual who chooses a mate based in part on the mate‘s race
and sex cannot be accused of human-rights-violating discrimination.
Alternatively, a state may be required to treat people as innocent
until they are proven guilty in all public settings, while a mother
choosing a nanny for her child does not morally have to reject
unconfirmed rumors as a basis for her choice. Especially when it
comes to enforcing complex imperfect obligations, states may be a
better target for legal tutelage than individuals.
Nowhere is this more evident than with respect to social rights,
rights for which Professor Sen has passionately argued in The Idea of
Justice and elsewhere.22 While the United States is not known for its
social rights at the federal constitutional level,23 many other countries
have embedded social rights in their domestic constitutions. How
21. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE LAW ch. 3 (1990) (discussing how state
officials may come to have different and denser obligations to act in particular
ways than might ordinary citizens).
22. See SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 379-84. See generally
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); Amartya Sen, Foreword to
PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEW
WAR ON THE POOR, at xi-xvii (2003).
23. Emily Zackin has shown in a prize-winning dissertation that social rights
have had a long history in American state constitutions, however. Emily Zackin,
Positive Constitutional Rights in the United States 3 (Nov., 2010) (Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University).
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have courts interpreted these constitutional rights? I‘ve recently
completed a survey of how domestic high courts have dealt with
cases involving social rights and have come away pleasantly
surprised at the creativity of courts in promoting realization of the
imperfect obligations that social rights create.24
The case law is wide-ranging and I cannot summarize most of it
here, but suffice it to say that courts generally do not say that they
have no power to interpret and enforce constitutional clauses in the
area of rights to education, housing, minimum income, and health
care on the grounds that these are human rights with too many
imperfect obligations, although they are. In a few cases, most
notably in Latin American high courts, judges actually provide as a
remedy precisely what the petitioner seeks (particularly access to
medical treatments or specific drugs where the national health
service has rejected a doctor‘s request).25 But more often, courts try
to craft a less direct strategy that encourages the realization of
imperfect obligations, a strategy that does not consist of bright-line
rules, but instead develops contextual approaches that focus on
requiring the state to do what it can to improve the lives of those
whose rights are at stake.
In considering how to enforce social rights, for example, courts
often say that a state may not deprive someone of a social right that
she already possesses. As a result, a person who already has housing
may not be thrown out into the streets when a state decides to take
over the property that the person has occupied. Instead, in those
cases, the state must provide alternative housing so as not to leave
24. See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, Address at the Annual Meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools: Social Rights in Constitutional Courts —
Strategies of Articulation and Strategies of Enforcement (Jan., 2009).
25. See, e.g., Florian F. Hoffmann & Fernando R. N. M. Bentes, Accountability
for Social and Economic Rights in Brazil, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
132-33 (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008) (recognizing a high level of
success for individual Brazilian plaintiffs who bring claims for access to medical
treatment or medicines); Horacio Javier Etchichury, Argentina: Social Rights,
Thorny Country: Judicial Review of Economic Policies Sponsored by the IFIs, 22
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 101, 111-15 (2006) (suggesting that Argentinian supreme
court and lower court decisions promoted their own legitimacy and garnered public
support by enforcing the right to life and the right to health care by requiring the
national government to provide medical treatment to vulnerable people).
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the individual worse off. The Modderklip case of the South African
Supreme Court of Appeal26 and the Olga Tellis case in India27
provide variants of this approach. In such cases, the state develops
new legal obligations to not make the situation of an individual any
worse off, even if the state had no legal obligation to provide housing
in the first place. Legal sanctions can attach to infringement of rights
even if the underlying right could not be enforced as a first-order
matter in domestic courts.
Alternatively, social rights can be used as interpretive guides to
other constitutional provisions. Rather than enforce a social right
directly, national courts sometimes read into the more directly
enforceable bright-line rights some ―overhang‖ from the social
rights. So, for example, some state courts in Germany have found
that the constitutional right to property includes ―old-age pensions,
health benefits, and unemployment compensation,‖ enabling people
to invoke due-process guarantees if the state threatens to remove the
benefits.28
The 1995 social rights cases of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court did something similar in establishing that
people who had paid into a state pension and health care fund had
property rights in the benefits that the funds were supposed to
provide.29 These rulings allow individuals to use the individual right
26. See President of S. Afr. v. Modderklip Boerdery Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) at
44-49 (S. Afr.) (holding that the national government has a constitutional
obligation to ensure access to housing or land for the homeless).
27. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 2 S.C.R. 51, para. 4.2
(India)(requiring the state to provide housing for pavement and slum dwellers who
were recorded in a census and whose housing was demolished). The Olga Tellis
case has been frequently misunderstood to have required a positive obligation of
the state to provide housing directly for all those who were affected. But, as an
article by Madhav Khosla shows, the Indian Supreme Court only required the
actual resettlement of those who had been enumerated in the local census and who
had been given prior promises of housing, while saying only that the government
should rather than must resettle the rest. Madhav Khosla, Making Social Rights
Conditional: Lessons from India, 8 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 739, 747 (2010).
28. See Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Guarantees of Social Welfare in the
Process of German Unification, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 311(1999) ( ―the goal of
social justice can be viewed as one of the main themes of the new constitutions of
the eastern states [that were unified with Western Germany at the end of the Cold
War], and this goal is explicitly proclaimed in the preambles of four of the five
new constitutions‖). Quint explains the decisions of the new state constitutional
courts in Germany, id. at 315-321).
29. See Kim Lane Scheppele, A Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights, 82 TEX.
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of property to enforce their claims to social benefits, a line of defense
that ensures that affected individuals have a voice and a forum in
court when state retrenchment occurs.
Finally, courts interpreting social rights provisions of domestic
constitutions sometimes construct those social rights as goals that the
state must show progress in realizing. In fact, domestic courts will
even use the very language of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to create this framework,
saying that a state must adopt certain policies to benefit the poor ―to
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights.‖30 This approach
permits courts to honor many of the contextual elements that
Professor Sen identifies as being characteristic of imperfect
obligations. For example, the South African Constitutional Court in
the famous Grootboom case adopted this approach by instructing the
state to create a program for the construction of housing for the poor
as a way of dealing with the difficult issues raised by the 800
homeless people who had camped out on private land.31 The
Supreme Court of Venezuela also took this approach when it told the
state that it had to create a program for increasing the availability of
drugs to fight HIV/AIDS.32 And the Indian Supreme Court in the
Gaurav Jain case ordered the Indian state to provide for the
―empowerment‖ of disadvantaged classes of people so that they

L. REV. 1921, 1946 (2004) (recognizing that because individuals had been required
to pay into the state system and had been prevented from securing private benefits,
the individuals had relied upon the state benefits and therefore the state could not
eliminate those benefits without due notice); see also LÁSZLÓ SÓLYOM & GEORG
BRUNNER, CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY: THE HUNGARIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 323-24 (2000) (citing Alkotmánybírdóság (AB)
[Constitutional Court] June 30, 1995, 43/1995 (Hung.)) (finding that when
individuals invested their income into the state social security system, the benefits
of that system effectively became the individual‘s property and must be protected
as such).
30. United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights art. 2, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
31. See Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 67 para. 99
(S. Afr.) (holding that the South African Constitution requires the state to create
and implement a program to ensure peoples‘ right to access of adequate housing).
32. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], July 15, 1999,
Bermudez et al. v. Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social, Case No. 15.789,
Decision No. 916 (Venez.).
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could realize their social rights.33 In each of these cases, courts
examined the social context and determined that the state could do
more than it was doing to make the lives of many poor people better.
The court did not order a direct remedy for the individuals who
brought the cases, but instead told the state that it was not doing
enough and had to do more for the class of individuals whom the
petitioners represented.
Most of the social rights cases either instruct states to set up
systems to do better than they have been doing or prevent states from
actively making a current situation worse. As a result, courts provide
an ally for those who are disadvantaged because they can encourage
the realization of certain sorts of imperfect obligations. In these
cases, courts evaluate whether states are taking seriously their
responsibilities to realize social rights, and, if not, then courts can
push states to do better. This seems to be precisely the sort of legal
enforcement of imperfect obligations that Professor Sen believes is
impossible for law to accomplish.
The fact that many particular rights cast long shadows of imperfect
obligations should not by itself be an argument against the use of law
to bolster these protections. Courts know how to specify what states
must do to realize their imperfect obligations – to do as much as they
can, when they can. Courts can stay on top of these issues,
monitoring state compliance with imperfect obligations and giving
new pushes when the state fails. Law is far from useless in pushing
states to realize their imperfect obligations.
There is much more to be said about this, but the creative
approaches of domestic high courts in dealing with social rights
cases might give Professor Sen some hope that law can be a partner
in his enterprise. Courts do not just enforce specific—or perfect—
obligations. Instead, many have been moving toward pressing states
to achieve the realization of imperfect obligations as well.

III.
Professor Sen is a law skeptic because, while he believes that law
33. Jain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3021 (India) (recognizing that
social integration and economic empowerment are fundamental rights ensured by
the Constitution and upheld by the Court and Government).
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may be one effective route for protecting human rights, he also
believes that law is not enough to guarantee their full realization.34
As Professor Sen argues, moral obligations to defend human rights
go above and beyond legal obligations.35 But in arguing for this, he
draws a sharp line between legal—that is, legislative—strategies and
all others. He seems to believe that all law has to offer is bright-line
rules.
But here too, Professor Sen might find that law can provide more
support for the realization of rights than he thinks. If law were as
narrow as Professor Sen believes— limited to legislation and formal
legal enactment— then one can see his point. But the shadow of law
spreads far beyond formal legality. It exists also outside the legal
system in the world of organizations built by lawyers and in the
politics that have grown up around a legal mentality. While narrow
legal enforcement of legislatively or constitutionally created rights is
one important aspect of what law can do to support human rights, a
constitutional culture may spread far beyond narrow legality to
create broader support for human rights, even when formal legality
fails to do so.
A constitutional culture will create a culture of rights. One hopes
this is true in the broader population, but it is very clearly true among
lawyers. Throughout many countries, and ever since human rights
appeared on the horizon of possibility, one sees the prominence of
legally trained people in the ranks of human rights advocates. Many
human rights organizations have been created and staffed by lawyers.
Even though recent years have seen the rise of a new cadre of experts
34. See Grotius Lecture, supra note 12, at 9 (―For some rights, the ideal route
may well not be legislation, but something else, such as recognition or agitation, or
even public discussion and education, with the hope to change the behaviour of
those who contribute to the violation of human rights.‖).
35. See id. at 8(―Providing inspiration for legislation is certainly one way in
which the ethical force of human rights have been constructively deployed. . . . To
acknowledge that such a connection exists is not the same thing as taking the
relevance of human rights to lie exclusively is their playing an inspirational or
justificatory role for actual legislation. It is important to see that the idea of human
rights can be, and is – actually, used in several other ways. It is easy to appreciate that
if human rights are seen as powerful moral claims - indeed as "moral rights" (to use
Hart's phrase) - then surely we have reason for some catholicity in considering
different avenues for promoting these claims.‖).
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in human rights with other forms of training, lawyers still play an
important role in most human rights organizations. For example,
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are both
organizations whose methods go beyond litigation and yet both have
been prominently led by lawyers.36 The International Commission of
Jurists is an important transnational human rights group, run by
lawyers and judges.37 Lawyers are key players in the international
debates over compliance with human rights norms. The human
rights movement has not been led only by lawyers, but lawyers have
been very important to the cause.38
Why are lawyers so prominent in the fight for human rights?
Research done by the working group led by Terence Halliday,
Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm Feeley shows why.39 In country after
36. See, e.g., Human Rights First Charter, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/about-us/human-rights-first-charter/ (last visited
Oct. 14, 2011) (observing that Human Rights First was formerly named the
Lawyer‘s Committee for Human Rights); Kenneth Roth, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
http://www.hrw.org/en/bios/kenneth-roth (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (noting that
Kenneth Roth, the current executive director of Human Rights Watch, is a former
U.S. federal prosecutor); The Nobel Peace Prize 1977 – Amnesty International,
NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1977/amnesty
-history.html(last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (stating that Amnesty International was
founded in 1961 by Peter Benenson, a British lawyer).
37. See
Overview,
INT‘L
COMMISSION
OF
JURISTS,
http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=441&langage=1&myPage=Overview (last
visited Oct. 14, 2011)(―The International Commission of Jurists is dedicated to the
primacy, coherence and implementation of international law and principles that
advance human rights. What distinguishes the International Commission of Jurists
(ICJ) is its impartial, objective and authoritative legal approach to the protection
and promotion of human rights through the rule of law. The ICJ provides legal
expertise at both the international and national levels to ensure that developments
in international law adhere to human rights principles and that international
standards are implemented at the national level.‖).
38. But, as Lucien Karpik has pointed out, summarizing the case studies
compiled for a book on the role of lawyers in autocratic political systems, lawyers
are better at defending some rights more than others: ―Attorneys . . . mobilisize
themselves only for individual rights. These rights include mainly freedom of
speech, of thought, of assembly, security rights, property rights and the right to
justice and due process of law. With some exceptions lawyers have not fought
outside this universe.‖ Lucien Karpik, Political Lawyers, in FIGHTING FOR
POLITICAL FREEDOM 463, 465 (Terence C. Halliday et al. eds., 2007) (emphasis in
original).
39.
See Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik, Politics Matter: a
Comparative Theory of Lawyers in the Making of Political Liberalism, in
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country, and over centuries, legally trained people have fought for
political liberalism, democracy, justice, rule of law, and human
rights. Even in authoritarian regimes, those who have been trained in
law are often central to domestic human rights struggles, often by
creating and maintaining autonomous courts that may provide relief
from the worst repression.40 As Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley wrote:
It is well known that the foundations of [political liberalism] were laid
down in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by European states and in
North America. It is less well known that lawyers frequently marched at
the vanguard of these movements toward political liberalism. Historical
and sociological studies demonstrate that legal professions often were
active builders of the institutions of liberal politics. In a variety of ways,
legal professions sought the moderation of state power via judicial
independence, the creation and mobilization of a politically engaged civil
society, and the vesting of rights in subjects as citizens who would be
protected by judiciaries.41

In addition to the case studies that Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley
mobilized for their volumes that show how lawyers have often been
crucial to establishing a government based on respect for rights, there
are other examples.
In 1930s Hungary, for example, anti-Semitism became state policy
and the professions were ordered to comply, but the professions split
in their responses. When Law XV of 1938 explicitly limited to 20
LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM 56-60 (Terence C.
Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 1997) (reviewing the historic role that lawyers in
several European countries and the United States have played in securing civil and
political rights, in substance and in procedure); Karpik, supra note 39, at 463-64
(discussing the roles that attorneys in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and
the United States have played in transforming authoritarian regimes with liberal
states). See generally FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES
OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Terence C. Halliday et al.
eds., 2007) (examining the liberal role of lawyers in illiberal regimes).
40. See RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES
13-14 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) (suggesting that the ―legal
complex‖ is essential to keeping the excesses of state power in check, and
providing examples of where aspects of the ―legal complex‖ may still be judicially
effective in an authoritarian regime, including in Taiwan where a bar association
was integral in resisting the KMT political party).
41. Terence C. Halliday et al., The Legal Complex in Struggles for Political
Liberalism, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM 1 (Terence C. Halliday et al.
eds., 2007).
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percent the percentage of Jews in the professions, the only member
of the cabinet to quit in protest was the Minister of Justice.42 The
mainline bar organizations simply refused to carry out the law.
Instead, ―the[se] measures . . . were discretely sabotaged for over
three years.‖43 The bar openly protested the law, while ―[e]very
loophole in the legislation was turned into a means of evasion.‖44
Was this open resistance to mandatory discrimination simply a
reflection of the fact that the educated elite in general resisted this
policy? Hardly. In fact, the role of other highly educated professions
makes it clear that education alone did not produce resistance to
infringement of rights. The engineers association largely kept quiet,
though engineers engaged in a silent mathematical protest. They kept
their Jewish members on board by simply increasing the number of
Christian clerical staff so that the 20 percent was calculated over a
larger denominator.45 The doctors, however, not only flocked in
greater numbers to the overtly anti-Semitic professional association,
but took matters into their own hands to disqualify many of their
Jewish colleagues from practice. When Hungary entered World War
II in 1941, the doctor‘s association helpfully provided to the Ministry
of Defense a list of all of the Jewish doctors who remained in
practice so that they could be assigned to physical labor service. 46
Among these three highly educated groups in inter-war Hungary,
only the lawyers stood out by publicly protesting the discriminatory
measures. Only legal education created professionals who felt that it
was their special responsibility to fight for rights.
Professor Sen rightly notes that the moral obligation to defend
42. See MÁRIA KOVÁCS, LIBERAL PROFESSIONS AND ILLIBERAL POLITICS:
HUNGARY FROM THE HABSBURGS TO THE HOLOCAUST 103, 107 (1994) (citing the
Minister of Justice‘s resignation letter in which the Minster explains that the
discriminatory laws sought to expropriate others‘ wealth, rather than building
Hungarian society through work).
43. Id. at 106.
44. Id. at 107-08.
45. See id. at 114-15 (stating that the new positions went to ―arch-Christian‖
hires, but that they often did little more than collect a paycheck while the Jewish
engineers handled the workload).
46. See id. at 119-20 (noting that an anti-Semitic, anti-welfare medical
organization also infiltrated the Chamber of Doctors and systematically
disqualified Jewish doctors, so that only 6 percent of the board remained Jewish, as
required by law).
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human rights goes beyond narrow legal obligations. But, empirically
speaking, those who have been trained in law are more likely to take
personal risks to fight for rights, even when the formal law pulls in a
different direction.
Formal law can, and in autocratic and
discriminatory societies generally does, pull in directions that
compromise rights. But lawyers have been been able to tell the
difference between law that infringes rights and law that bolsters
rights. Where formal law orders rights violations, lawyers are often
in the front lines of protest.
So, while law is not enough to provide a full and guaranteed
defense of human rights, I would counsel Professor Sen to regard
lawyers as some of his best allies in his fight.

CONCLUSIONS
Professor Sen‘s body of work on the importance of human rights
should be an inspiration to all of us. His Grotius Lecture brings to an
audience of international lawyers some of the key elements of his
defense of human rights. In this lecture, we can see his abiding sense
that we all are obligated to do what we can to improve the lives of
the millions—even billions—of people for whom the promise of
human rights has not yet been realized. In honor of this year‘s
Grotius Lecture, we should all recommit ourselves to the fight for
human rights. Judging from the sheer number of people in the room
and the enthusiasm with which Professor Sen‘s lecture has been
greeted, I can see the Professor Sen‘s words have had their intended
effect.
My remarks are designed to ensure that Professor Sen realizes that
a giant ballroom full of international lawyers is the most supportive
audience he can imagine, and that law is a better ally in his life‘s
work than he knows. I hope Professor Sen‘s appearance at the
meetings of the American Society for International Law will
convince him that he can count on international lawyers as his allies.

